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Crises are associated with search for meaning and security. In recent years, they have also 
been associated with increased attention to conspiracy theories. Such theories about COVID-
19 have been many. We looked at several COVID-specific conspiracy theories and their 
relation to a number of other measures, including religiosity in a highly educated Norwegian 
convenience sample (N = 1225). Conspiracy mentality, lack of trust, and religiosity were 
directly associated with conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19, whereas self-reported stress and 
negative emotions related to the pandemic had only small, indirect effects. Unlike previous 
research, we found no effect of gender or age. 
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As with any high impact event, the COVID-19 pandemic was followed by a host of 
conspiracy theories. Tied to mistrust of governments and science, the longer the pandemic has 
lasted, the more people have also been willing to act out opposition in the streets and 
elsewhere. On January 30th of 2021, conspiracy believers blocked access to Dodger stadium in 
Los Angeles for hours, halting the mass vaccination that the stadium was repurposed to 
(Ecarma 2021). Conspiracy theories that attributed COVID-19 to radiation from 5G cellphone 
networks resulted in attacks on both 5G masts and people working on them (Temperton 2020; 
Jolley and Paterson 2020).  
 
The present paper analyzes the relation between conspiracy theories, religion, meaning in life, 
COVID-stress, and a set of measures commonly thought to predict conspiracy beliefs in a 
data set from Norway (n=1225). The data was gathered as a Norwegian version of an 
Austrian-German study (Schnell and Krampe 2020) on COVID-stress and meaning in life. 
These are therefore included as part of our analysis. 
 
As we have reason to believe the literature on conspiracy beliefs and its predictors will be 
least familiar to the reader, we will address those first, before moving on to the relation to 
religion and the COVID-situation. We follow the general structure of quantitative analyses 
(IMRAD), but to assist the readers, we will interpret and discuss a bit as we go. Previous 
ventures in studying conspiracy beliefs in Norway show little reason to expect that 
Norwegians will deviate much in mechanisms or direction of relations with regard to 
conspiracy beliefs when compared with other Western countries (Dyrendal, Kennair, and 
Bendixen 2021). Nevertheless, since research into the situation with COVID-19 is an ongoing 
affair, we will first test some of the general findings on COVID-specific conspiracy beliefs. 
Since the special situation of the early phase of the corona pandemic warrants it, we will also 
check some of the established findings on conspiracy beliefs before we move on to religion-
related relations. 
 
1.1. Conspiracy beliefs and their predictors 
 
Conspiracy theory, conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy narratives are usually synonyms, with 
“conspiracy theory” being the main concept used for “beliefs” that covert, sinister, organized 
conspirators are behind troubling situations. Epistemically, they tend to be treated as 
scientifically unwarranted and group nicely with other such beliefs (Stone et al. 2018), and 
they tend to break with criteria for sound reasoning and sound treatment of data (Butter 2020; 
Uscinski and Parent 2014).  
 
From a religious studies perspective, conspiracy beliefs are usually seen as serving the 
function of theodicy: they explain evil by blaming a certain set of actors for intentionally 
causing the experienced problems. Conspiracy theories are thus “simplistic”, although not 
necessarily simple, explanations of evil, in that they lead back to the intentional actions of 
coalitions of other humans (Barkun 2003; Dyrendal, Robertson, and Asprem 2018). At the 
social level, they may serve as apocalyptic mythologies, delineating right and wrong, 
 
 
sketching a path towards relief from evils while presenting social ideals in the shape of the 
values and targets the alleged conspiracy is attacking. 
 
Being tied to the purpose of explaining evil, conspiracy beliefs are thought to be activated 
especially in situations of crisis, anomie, and powerlessness (van Prooijen 2018; van Prooijen, 
Klein, and Dordevic 2020).  These situations may exacerbate emotions such as fear, anxiety, 
anger, and distrust. The “epistemic” quest for explanation is as such only one of the uses of 
conspiracy beliefs. While powerful actors and manipulators may use such theories cynically, 
conspiracy theories are used by common people in everyday situations for three overarching 
purposes: epistemic – attempts to gain knowledge; existential – attempts to feel safer; and 
social – attempts to feel good about one’s ingroup (Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka 2017). 
Conspiracy beliefs seem rarely to succeed in fulfilling these needs, even at the subjective 
level (ibid.). Some research finds them instead to be associated with increased social isolation, 
depression, substance abuse, and feelings of powerlessness (Freeman and Bentall 2017). At 
the emotional level, conspiracy beliefs are often positively related to the very emotions 
situations that they are “supposed” to address: distrust is robustly associated with conspiracy 
beliefs (Sutton and Douglas 2020), anxiety and depression are often associated (Douglas, 
Cichocka, and Sutton 2020; van Prooijen 2018), and lately, anger has been more in focus 
(Bowes et al. 2020; Jolley and Paterson 2020) as related to the violent outcome of conspiracy 
beliefs.    
 
Common psychological underpinnings on the individual differences level include higher 
scores on schizotypal traits (Barron et al. 2014), narcissism (Cichocka, Marchlewska, and 
Golec de Zavala 2016), Machiavellianism (Douglas and Sutton 2011), and psychopathy 
(March and Springer 2019). At the cognitive level, predictors include overidentification of 
agency and patterns (van Prooijen, Douglas, and De Inocencio 2018; Douglas et al. 2016), 
anthropomorphism (Brotherton and French 2015), and teleological thinking (Wagner-Egger et 
al. 2018). They are further associated with reliance on intuition rather than rational inquiry to 
get facts (Swami et al. 2014), with increased tolerance for incoherence, logical inconsistency 
and self-contradictions (Lewandowsky, Cook, and Lloyd 2018), and with less concern with 
the factual bases for claims, and with thinking that facts are political constructions (Garrett 
and Weeks 2017).  
 
While conspiracy thinking forms a coherent, seemingly unified “mentality” (Bruder et al. 
2013), specific conspiracy beliefs differ, both in content and form. Content is more than that 
some conspiracy theories lean left, and others lean right. Some are focused on highly specific 
events, such as the deaths of JFK or princess Diana. Others center on large-scale events or 
systems, with the target of the conspiracy presented as not merely one’s ingroup, but its most 
innocent representatives and sacred values (Barkun 2003). The former tends to be more 
attentive to details (being narrower in scope) than the latter, and the two types may not draw 
equally on the motivations and individual differences observed when looking generally at 
conspiracy beliefs. Recent theorizing (Sternisko, Cichocka, and van Bavel 2020) 
differentiates between conspiracy theory as content and as form. The content-dimension – e.g. 
who are blamed, and what is identified as the problem – may draw more on characteristics 
 
 
tied to group identification. We are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories if we think 
our ingroup accepts them (Cookson et al. 2021) and if the targets belong to groups that we are 
already skeptical of (Imhoff and Bruder 2014; Wood and Gray 2019). The “form”-dimension 
– e.g. how conspiracy theories are organized like “games” of meaning-making, revealing 
hidden patterns behind events – may activate more along lines of individual differences 
related to the need for uniqueness (Imhoff and Lamberty 2017), tendency to magical thinking 
(Barron et al. 2018), or fantasy-proneness (Stone et al. 2018).  
 
The dynamics of conspiracy beliefs are likely to vary somewhat depending on their targets 
and their collective grounding. However, the overarching findings is that they generally serve 
to increase polarization and decrease interpersonal trust (Sutton and Douglas 2020); they 
demotivate people for democratic participation but increase the acceptance for violence as 
political tools (Imhoff, Dieterle, and Lamberty 2020) and increase intergroup hatred (Jolley, 
Meleady, and Douglas 2020). 
 
1.2. Conspiracy theory, religion, and COVID-19 
 
How does any of this relate to religion? 
 
If we start at the most general level, there are multiple ways to look at the relation between 
conspiracy theories and religion. Conspiracy theories have, for instance, been proposed as a 
continuation of religious thought in the secular realm, tied to secularization and proposed as a 
replacement theodicy (Popper 2002). In a similar vein, they have been seen as a result of 
specific religious frames and narratives (i.e. apokalypsis), and therefore thought to be more 
tied to some forms of religion than others (Robertson and Dyrendal 2019). In the practical 
world of consequences and intergroup relations, they have been tied to interreligious hatred as 
ways of constructing and demonizing outgroups (Dyrendal, Robertson, and Asprem 2018). In 
practice, specific conspiracy beliefs can be anywhere from positively to negatively correlated 
to specific instances of religion (Dyrendal 2020b).  
 
Some ways of doing religion do seem to be more generally associated with conspiracy beliefs. 
Apocalypticism, “Manichean” dualism, fundamentalism, and paranormal beliefs are traits that 
not only go well with each other; they are also separately correlated with higher scores on 
conspiracy beliefs (Dyrendal, Kennair, and Lewis 2017; Oliver and Wood 2018). Some of this 
is probably more tied to conspiracy theories as part of internal culture (Asprem and Dyrendal 
2018), with group defense in the form of collective, motivated cognition (Cichocka et al. 
2015; Kreko 2015) a more proximate mechanism. Other explanations for the association may 
be tied more closely to individual level differences in intuitive and associative “magical” 
thinking (Barron et al. 2018; Dyrendal, Kennair, and Bendixen 2021).1  
 
 
1 It seems likely that the variance in conspiracy beliefs in more individualistic religion with looser social ties will 
be more determined by individual-level differences, and thus the “form”-dimension of conspiracy narratives. 
 
 
For our purposes here, the central concern is the role of conspiracy beliefs and religion in the 
face of crisis. Both are thought to serve as theodicy in response to suffering. Conspiracy 
theories have often been proposed as a response to feeling a lack of control, where postulating 
conspiracy is meant to restore feelings of meaning and agency (van Prooijen and Acker 2015; 
Stojanov and Halberstadt 2020). Religion being another supplier of the same needs, they can 
work in tandem, they can be competitors, and they can be independent of each other. The 
weight of the evidence indicate that they are in general more likely to be correlated (Oliver 
and Wood 2014; 2018). However, most of the evidence for that position is from regions and 
populations (e.g. American Evangelicals) where adherents of the type of religion involved are 
more prone to broader paranormal and dualistic beliefs than what we generally expect from 
Nordic believers.  
 
There is also the matter of what role crisis management in the form of “need for control” 
plays in conspiracy beliefs. Studies are inconsistent (Douglas, Cichocka, and Sutton 2020). 
One thing is the difference between conspiracy mentality and situation-specific conspiracy 
beliefs (Stojanov and Halberstadt 2020), controlled studies that passed ethics boards can 
hopefully not compare to a crisis like COVID-19 (van Prooijen and Acker 2015). The current 
situation could therefore provide a reasonable, further test of the association.  
 
There are, however, many understudied issues here. First, we neither know nor have good 
theoretical reasons to decide whether crises should, in the short run, increase conspiracy 
beliefs. Another mechanism for dealing with crisis, is to increase trust in authorities (Kye and 
Hwang 2020) to alleviate feelings of distress. While those most prone to conspiracy beliefs 
may heighten their conspiracy mindset already at an early stage, even larger portions of the 
populations may cope by submitting to expertise and/or the reigning political authorities. 
Second, there is the relation to religion to consider. People in crisis-situations, as we see in the 
COVID-pandemic, seem to be more likely to feel a loss of meaning in life (de Jong, Ziegler, 
and Schippers 2020; Schnell and Krampe 2020), and the role of religion in managing the 
emotional and social fallout of crisis seems more clear-cut, as a traditional route for handling 
crisis and loss of meaning.  
 
While not a primary focus of behavioral research during COVID, some results related to 
religion exist. In a Turkish setting, positive religious coping was tied to more meaning in life, 
less loneliness, and less negative coping mechanisms (Yıldırım et al. 2021). However, 
“negative” religious coping mechanisms had the opposite result. This is not surprising, as 
negative religious coping comprises techniques of demonization, discontent with others and 
with the object of worship, while positive religious coping goes in the other direction. Some 
of these feelings – distrust, social discontent, demonization – are tied to conspiracy beliefs. 
While the Turkish study did not explicitly include conspiracy theorizing in any role, it 
therefore implies something about which relation to expect.  
 
The research on COVID-conspiracy theories find such beliefs, as expected, associated with 
lower trust (van Mulukom et al. 2021), greater mental distress and anxiety (Leibowitz et al. 
2021), lower concern for close others and higher for oneself (Teovanovic et al. 2020), and 
 
 
support for violence (Jolley and Paterson 2020; Imhoff and Lamberty 2020). Most COVID-
related studies also find conspiracy belief to correlate with lower conformity with 
recommended, protective health-behavior (Biddlestone, Green, and Douglas 2020), including 
less intention to vaccinate (Bertin, Nera, and Delouvée 2020). It may therefore seem likely 
that conspiracy beliefs would be associated with “negative coping mechanisms” and thus go 
in the opposite direction of religion as “positive coping”. The few studies to date that do look 
at both conspiracy theories and religion in light of COVID-19 are, however, mixed. Data from 
Korea indicate that while Christianity negatively impacted conspiracy beliefs, higher 
religiosity across religious identities was positively correlated (Kim and Kim 2021). A study 
from Turkey also found that increased religiosity predicted higher COVID-conspiracy beliefs 
(Alper, Bayrak, and Yilmaz, 2020). In a Western setting, Leibowitz et al. (2021) found that 
greater religiosity and spirituality was associated with higher specific (including COVID-
related) and general conspiracy beliefs among U.S. and Canadian respondents. Greater 
conspiracy beliefs were associated with higher anxiety, an association that became stronger in 
follow-up. They did not analyze how religion affected anxiety levels.  
 
 
2. Goals and predictions 
 
Since there are few good empirical and theoretical reasons to issue robust predictions, most of 
our investigation here is exploratory. This also goes for some, but not all, of the topics where 
we do issue some predictions based on extant research. When we do issue predictions in these 
cases, it is to stress where the weight of current evidence seems to lie before we check what 
our data shows.   
 
Two such predictions concern simple relations that have been confidently announced in 
popular press based on limited extant research: 1) men should be more prone to COVID 
conspiracy beliefs than women (Cassese, Farhart, and Miller 2020), 2) younger respondents 
should be more prone than older (Duplaga 2020). As effect sizes concerning such 
relationships are typically small and vary between specific theories, this general finding could 
relate to specific versions of conspiracy theories. We will therefore test them specifically 
against the conspiracy items of the survey separately rather than use the scale of COVID-
conspiracy beliefs.  
 
Other relationships are more robust, and we predict them with confidence. Trust should 
predict lower conspiracy beliefs and lower conspiracy mentality – especially should trust in 
authority be clearly negatively related to conspiracy mentality, given that the measure is 
constructed around suspicion towards those in power (Imhoff and Bruder 2014).  
 
Another robust expectation may seem surprising to the uninitiated: we expect that all COVID-
related conspiracy beliefs in our measure, even those that are clearly in opposition to each 
other, will be positively correlated. This in fact goes back to one of the best-established 
findings of conspiracy beliefs: that belief in one, predicts belief in others (Goertzel 1994). The 
precise reasons why are debated, but this is one of the reasons why we have concepts like 
 
 
“conspiracist mindset” or “conspiracy mentality”, and previous research into conspiracy 
beliefs has repeatedly shown that even contradictory conspiracy beliefs are positively 
correlated (Wood, Douglas, and Sutton 2012; Imhoff and Lamberty 2020). Our survey 
included such contradictory COVID-items and we expect them to be clearly related; indeed, 
this is a condition for our COVID-conspiracy beliefs scale (below). 
 
Negative affections, such as feelings of anxiety, depression, and anger should all be positively 
associated with conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality. However, the survey primarily 
used a 12-item version of the “Positive and Negative Affect Scale” (Schnell 2020; Watson, 
Clark, and Tellegan 1988) – 7 items of negative affections (upset, ashamed, hostile, nervous, 
afraid, guilty, lonely)  and 5 items of positive (active, inspired, alert, dedicated, attentive). It is 
less clear that this range of self-reported feelings considered together should have any effect 
either way, but it seems more likely that the negative emotions would correlate positively 
with conspiracy mentality and specific COVID-related conspiracy beliefs than not, while the 
positive self-reports could be more related to religiosity. It seems prima facie unlikely that the 
positive emotions would be correlated with conspiracy beliefs.  
 
Even if negative emotions outside the usual range of measures should be correlated with 
conspiracy beliefs, it is less clear whether this means that the expressed feelings of 
meaningfulness or crisis of meaning must follow. Results are few. There may be no effect of 
conspiracy beliefs on expressed meaning in life (Bakracheva 2019), whereas the search for 
meaning may possibly be positively correlated (Graeupner and Coman 2017). Most 
conspiracy believers may find some meaning, not desperation in their beliefs, and it may be 
that the grasping at those feelings of meaning is one of the reasons why conspiracy beliefs are 
hard to shake (van Prooijen and Acker 2015). The simple assumption that COVID-conspiracy 
beliefs and conspiracy mentality should both be negatively correlated with meaning, is thus 
contradicted by some extant results and the postulated role of conspiracy thinking as attempts 
at creating meaning. We think the results are too few and not sufficiently grounded to predict 
a result, but the relation is sufficiently interesting and related to the field of religion to explore 
further. 
 
In contrast, and especially with the measure of religiosity we are using (more on this below), 
we would expect religiosity to be positively associated with meaning in life, and negatively 
with anger, anxiety, and depression.  
 
As noted above, there can be socio-cultural variations in the relation between conspiracy 
beliefs and religiosity. They also vary between specific theories and different types of 
religion. We expect our recruitment strategy to favor respondents with high education and 
liberal religion. They would be less likely to hold the kind of “Manichean” and apocalyptic 
beliefs that reliably predict conspiracy beliefs among North American believers (Oliver and 
Wood 2014). We will therefore not necessarily expect that the findings of Leibowitz et al. 
(2021) on religion and COVID-conspiracy beliefs – that they correlate positively – to 
generalize to our respondents. This is partly because trust towards other people and central 
institutions should be clearly negatively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We have reason to 
 
 
believe that liberal religion is positively associated with trust (Daniels and von der Ruhr 
2010), and given the way we recruited participants, we would therefore expect religion in our 
measure to be positively associated with trust. This should on its own predict lower beliefs in 
conspiracy theories. However, it is not clear that this increased trust, if it holds, will overcome 





3.1. Collection   
The survey was conducted via the University of Oslo’s online tool “nettskjema.no” from 7 
May - 7 June 2020. It asked how people experienced and adapted to the corona crisis, as well 
as about beliefs, attitudes and emotional experiences. Information about the study was posted 
on various websites and announced through social media. Several organizations, 
municipalities, denominations etc., were informed about the study and encouraged to 
participate. The data collection ("snowball sampling") does not provide a basis for the study 
to be representative at national level, but it is suitable when the purpose is to produce a rich 
material that can provide in-depth insight and thus contribute to generating further research. 
 
A large part of the questionnaire related to the experience and management of the corona 
crisis, is, as mentioned above, taken from a collaborative study conducted in Austria and 
Germany (Schnell and Krampe 2020). Other questions were based on media reports about 
what people did during the closure in the spring of 2020. A total of 36 statements about 
experiences with the corona crisis were asked. The questionnaire also included several 
questions about psychological conditions, religiosity, and attitudes, as well as open-ended 
questions about people’s experiences. Processing time for the whole questionnaire was 
approximately 12 minutes.  
 
3.2 Participants 
We received 1225 complete answers from predominantly female (73.2 percent) respondents. 
The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 89 years, evenly distributed over the entire age 
range and with an average of 50.2 years for all, 49.8 years for women and 51.6 years for men.  
 
Seven out of ten were married (53%) or cohabiting (17%), 16 per cent were single, ten per 
cent divorced and two per cent widows or widowers. Almost all (80 percent) had children. 
Just over half, 58% belonged to the Church of Norway, which is lower than in official 
statistics for the Norwegian population (69%, Statistics Norway). Seven percent belonged to 
other Christian denominations (about the same as official statistics), four percent belonged to 
a Muslim congregation (off. stat. 3%), and seven percent were members of the Norwegian 
Humanist Association (off. stat. 2%). 22 per cent stated that they were not members 
anywhere, which is slightly higher than in the Norwegian population (approx. 15-18%). 
 
The level of education was high, with 67% having completed education at university or 




A large proportion of the study population worked in the health care system (27%) or the 
education sector (19%). Six per cent worked in religious or philosophical communities or in 
non-profit organizations and five per cent in the cultural sector. Twelve percent were retired, 
and six percent were students. Six percent were disabled or on longer sick leave. The others 
were spread over a number of different industries such as trade, hotels and tourism, transport, 
municipal services and more. Four percent were temporarily laid off due to the pandemic. 









We assembled the different items into main category scores. 
 
Trust 
The survey had nine trust items. Factor analysis revealed that they loaded on two factors. 
After inspection of the items and their correlations, we divided the trust issues into two scales: 
one related to trust in official institutions (government, parliament, health institutions, and 
health authorities), and one on trust in a variety of organizations of civil society (political 
parties, religious organizations, environmentalist organizations, cultural institutions), which 
also included an odd item of trust in social media.2  
 
Trust in official institutions showed good reliability as measured by Cronbach’s alpha (α = 
0.83), while trust in the diversity of other organizations and social media, tentatively called 
“trust in volunteer organizations” was just below conventional cutting point for acceptable 
reliability at 0.69. Both scales are scored as participant mean of all four and five items. 
 
Religiosity 
The survey used eight items measuring religiosity and spirituality from Schnell’s (2020) 
sources of meaning and meaning in life-measure, scored on a range from 0 to 5. The items 
have previously been validated for a Norwegian sample (Sørensen et al. 2018).  
 
At inspection, the items seemed to be mostly construed around the same type of empirical 
religion – a general expression of “liberal”, non-confessional religiosity, but with two items 
deviating. Factor analysis confirmed that the items loaded on two factors. These were not the 
same as Schnell’s constructs of religion and spirituality. Six items were highly intercorrelated, 
whereas two items relating to belief in a predetermined fate and teleological worldview made 
 
2 Using social media as news source is usually positively correlated with conspiracy beliefs. This item may 
merely measure more general trust in one’s own social network, since it does not ask for how it is used. It was 
unrelated to conspiracy beliefs. 
 
 
up the other factor. A scale with only the six items not related explicitly to fate showed 
excellent internal reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94, which dropped to 0.89 when the 
two fate-items were included. Nevertheless, the scale was constructed on the mean of all 8 
items.   
 
Conspiracy mentality 
The survey used a 5-item measure of “conspiracy mentality” – which predicts a general 
propensity to draw on conspiracy theories in explaining events (Bruder et al. 2013) – that has 
been validated for Norway before (Dyrendal 2020a; Dyrendal, Kennair, and Bendixen 2021). 
The items loaded on one factor, and reliability was good at α = 0.88. The scale was 
constructed using the mean score on all items, measured from 0 to 10. 
 
Covid-conspiracy beliefs 
While conspiracy mentality predicts a large part of the variance of belief in most conspiracy 
theories, it is a very suboptimal surrogate for the specific conspiracy beliefs surrounding 
events. The survey gathered five items relating to specific conspiracy-related COVID-19 
beliefs from international surveys (Biddlestone, Green, and Douglas 2020; Imhoff and 
Lamberty 2020). They were scored from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). One item was about the 
reality and importance of COVID-19, while the other five were about competing causes. Of 
these five, the first was a reverse-phrased item that used the reigning scientific hypothesis of 
an evolved virus as cause to anchor respondents outside conspiratorial explanations. A sixth 
item was “COVID-19 is Nature’s own way of healing the world” and thus not truly a 
conspiracy theory. It is, however, underpinned by many of the same underlying emotional and 
cognitive factors as conspiracy beliefs and should therefore correlate highly.  
 
Denying a natural explanation is an important element in arguing for design, but there are 
well-known problems with reverse-phrased items (cf. Schnell 2009, p.484). Although factor 
analysis showed that all six items loaded on a single factor, we decided to construct and run 
the scale-related analyses of COVID-conspiracy theories on only the mean score of the four 
specific conspiracy theories for clarity of purpose and simplicity of interpretation. The scale 
showed good reliability (α = 0.82). 
 
Meaningfulness 
Meaningfulness, “a fundamental sense of meaning, based on an appraisal of one’s life as 
coherent, significant, directed, and belonging” (Schnell 2009) was taken from Schnell’s 
(2020) sources of meaning-measure. It consisted of five items, scored on a scale from 0 to 5. 
The items loaded on two factors. One was related to life satisfaction in a more everyday way 
(“I think what I do is important”), while the other related to a larger, “religious” frame of 
reference (“I think my life has a deeper meaning”). The scale was constructed on mean score 
of all items and showed good reliability (α= 0.79). 
 
Crisis of meaning is from the same measure but is not simply the opposite of meaningfulness. 
Where the former is partly unconsciously experienced, crises of meaning are experienced 
more consciously, and they are transient, in that they trigger a search for meaning that may 
 
 
alleviate the crisis. Sample items include “I feel that my life is meaningless” and “I 
experience my life as empty”. The items loaded on one factor. The scale was constructed 
from the mean score on all items and showed excellent reliability (α = 0.9).   
 
Emotions: PANAS Positive and Negative Affections  
 
The effect of emotions was measured by mean scores on the items of PANAS positive and 
PANAS negative affections. The negative affections scale loaded on two factors, but these 
were closely enough correlated that we see no good reason to separate them, and thus used all 
seven items in one scale with good reliability (α = 0.82). The positive affections loaded on 
one factor and had identical reliability (α = 0.82).  
 
Covid-related feelings of stress  
 
The survey asked about feelings of stress related specifically to COVID-19. Common wisdom 
would have such expressed feelings of stress be related to conspiracy beliefs, even more to 
COVID-specific conspiracy beliefs, but extant research is divided. While some find a clear 
correlation (Taylor et al. 2020), others do not (Georgiou, Delfabbro, and Balzan 2020). The 
scale has seven items, expressing fear of the pandemic, irritation, fear for living conditions, 
etc. It loaded on two factors and had acceptable reliability (α = 0.72).  
 
4. Results  
As we can see in table 1, very few of our respondents reported experiencing crisis of meaning, 
and scores on conspiracy mentality and COVID-specific conspiracy beliefs were very low. 
The level of trust in authorities was high, as was trust in volunteer organizations. The reported 
levels of positive affect were relatively high, whereas reports of negative affect were 
relatively low. The level of religiosity was moderate.  
 
Scores on COVID-conspiracy beliefs were closely and positively correlated. The only 
insignificant correlation was between the reverse-phrased item and “Gaia’s revenge”. The 
items involved in our scale correlated in the range of 0.43-0.79, and the contradictory theories 
correlated at high levels (r > 0.5).  
 
We found no correlation between COVID-conspiracy beliefs and age, and an independent 
samples t-test showed no significant differences in COVID-conspiracy beliefs between men 
and women. Similarly, those reporting least anxiety and depression did not differ in 
conspiracy beliefs from those who reported most. Conspiracy beliefs relating to COVID were 
best predicted by conspiracy mentality and diminished trust in authorities, followed by 
religiosity and diminished trust in volunteer organizations. Other effects were very small. 
 
Religiosity was most strongly correlated with experiencing meaningfulness, then close to 
moderately with trust in volunteer organizations. There was a small, negative correlation 
between religiosity and reporting COVID-related stress. Apart from the above-mentioned 





Zero-order (Pearson’s r) correlation between the variables used in the analyses. 
 
Variable M   (SD) 1 2 3 4 5   6  7 8 9 
1. Covid-CT 1.4 (.78)          
2.ConMent 1.8 (1.95) .53***         
3.Religiosity 1.98 (1.45) .22*** .16***        
4.Covid stress 1.58 (.88) .08*** .18*** -.11***       
5.TrustAuth 3.35 (.5) -.37*** -.51*** -.07* -.18***      
6.TrustVol 2.5 (.5) -.17*** -.34*** .26*** -.08** .42***     
7.PANAS- 
NA 
1.8 (.69) .09*** .18*** .01 .62*** -.12*** -.00    
8.PANAS- 
PA 
3.3 (.77) -.02 -.05 .09** -.42*** .11*** .12*** -.27***   
9.Meaning 3.35 (1.11) .07** -.00 .64*** -.29*** .09*** .33*** -.15*** .40***  
10.Crisis of 
meaning 
0.59 (.93) .08** .158*** -.01** .51*** -.11*** -.04 .52*** -.41*** -.37*** 
Note Abbreviations: 1. Covid conspiracy beliefs. 2. Conspiracy Mentality. 5. Trust in authorities. 6. Trust in volunteer 
organizations. *p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
When entered into a regression, there were only three measures that contributed to COVID-
conspiracy beliefs on their own. Conspiracy mentality and religiosity both contributed 





 Linear regression with COVID-conspiracy beliefs as dependent variable (n=1225) 
 
Independent variables B (S.E)    B T 
Conspiracy mentality .18 (.01)  .44 14.99*** 
Religiosity .08 (.02)  .16 4.58*** 
COVID Stress    -.00 (.03) -.00 -.10 
Trust in authorities -.21 (.05) -.13 -4.49*** 
Trust in volunteer orgs            -.01 (.11) -.01 -.11 
PANAS Negative Affect            -.02 (.04) -.02 -.48 
PANAS Positive Affect            -.01 (.03)  .01 .28 
Meaningfulness .02 (.03) -.02 .15 
Crisis of meaning .00 (.03)  .01 .15 
Note. Adjusted R2= .31, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
For religiosity, the situation was different. Every measure but negative affect still contributed 
significantly, even if it was in a very small way. Meaningfulness is most strongly associated, 
and when controlled for other factors, crisis of meaning is also positively associated.   
 
Table 3. 




Independent variables B (S.E)    B T 
Conspiracy mentality  .06 (.02)  .09 2.28** 
COVID Conspiracy beliefs  .20 (.04)  .11 4.58*** 
COVID Stress   -.18 (.05) -.00 -.11*** 
Trust in authorities  -.23 (.07) -.08 -3.21** 
Trust in volunteer orgs           .35 (.07) -.12 5.05*** 
PANAS Negative Affect         -.02 (.06) -.01 -.40 
PANAS Positive Affect -.28 (.04) -.15 -6.26*** 
Meaningfulness  .92 (.03)  .71 28.89*** 
Crisis of meaning  .35 (.04)  .23 8.63*** 
Note. Adjusted R2= .52, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
5. Discussion 
Conspiracy mentality emerged as the best predictor of belief in conspiracy theories about 
COVID-19. This is as we would expect; like the negative relation to trust, this is in line with 
results on almost all types of conspiracy beliefs (Imhoff and Bruder 2014). We could not 
replicate extant results on gender and age regarding who believes more in COVID-conspiracy 
theories. One should not read much into this, as one probably should not expect these results 
to replicate unless samples and items are similar. Items matter. When we looked at the 
COVID-conspiracy items separately we did see some significant differences between men 
and women on two items (5G and “Gaia’s revenge”), but while women scored higher, the 
differences were very small. 
 
COVID-specific conspiracy beliefs were only tenuously associated with emotion-measures 
like COVID-stress, PANAS negative affect, or crisis of meaning. Conspiracy mentality was 
however clearly tied to all three, albeit the effect was small.3 Any effect of these “stressors” 
on COVID-specific conspiracy beliefs was indirect.  
 
Religiosity was weakly negatively tied to COVID-stress. It was as expected strongly tied to 
reporting meaningfulness. We see from the regression that it was also tied to the search for 
meaning in general, as crisis of meaning becomes positively associated. Religiosity also 
turned out to be one of the few measures significantly associated with COVID-specific 
conspiracy beliefs. Although the relation is weak, this is only to some extent what we would 
expect. We notice that among the positive correlates of religiosity we, as expected, find trust, 
but it is limited to trust in “volunteer organizations”. The correlation to trust in authorities, the 
strongest negative predictor of conspiracy beliefs, is instead very weakly negative. This leaves 
the underlying cognitive traits that tend to predict both conspiracy beliefs and religion. Our 
measure of religiosity lacks items covering Manichean and apocalyptic beliefs, but it does 
include others that are highly consonant with thinking styles associated with conspiracy 
beliefs. The item asking about seeing intentional meaning behind events is one of them, belief 
in miracles another. Items expressing belief that there are hidden realities behind what is 
 
3 Convention for a small effect is r of 0.1-0.3. 
 
 
known to us can be interpreted by some respondents in ways that are very close to general 
conspiracy beliefs, and teleological thinking, the second factor we found in the measure, is 
also a known to be clearly associated. Looking more closely by separating the factors, we 
found that the two items on teleological thinking had the strongest positive effect on 
conspiracy beliefs. However, when we exclude those from the measure of religiosity, the 
relation was still positive and significant even in the regression.  
 
The research community has long tied conspiracy beliefs to threatening and stressful 
situations. Reported stress and other, related factors played no substantial role in predicting 
conspiracy beliefs among our respondents. However, our respondents reported neither high 
stress from COVID-19 nor much belief in conspiracy theories, and the relationship between 
them was negligible, whereas stress and negative affect was somewhat more highly related to 
conspiracy mentality. There is a possibility that this reflects more general issues. It currently 
seems that conspiracy mentality is a fairly stable orientation and that it may be less influenced 
by situational effects than previously suspected. Since conspiracy mentality is the central 
predictor of specific beliefs and other measures are more highly correlated with conspiracy 
mentality, it is perhaps not all that surprising that while we do see an effect of COVID stress 
and negative affect on COVID-specific conspiracy theories, it is very small, and when 
controlled for other factors, there is no direct effect. Further research needs to look at crisis 
and conspiracy beliefs longitudinally, with representative population samples, and study 
levels of conspiracy mentality as well as of levels specific conspiracy beliefs.  
 
5.1. Limitations 
Our respondents were a highly educated convenience sample recruited via snowballing from a 
network of researchers, many of whom are tied to healthcare and to church-related 
psychology of religion. The findings from this group of respondents should therefore be seen 
as a set of possible relations to possibly be investigated further, and when surprising, one 
should not think it will generalize to a larger public. The distributions on conspiracy mentality 
is, for instance, normally distributed in a representative sample of Norwegians (Dyrendal 
2020a), but it was very right-skewed in this sample. Some results are, however, as one would 
expect, and some of the results on questions we thought open may further highlight which 
dynamics seem to be more important. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Conspiracy mentality, lack of trust, and religiosity were the only direct contributors to 
COVID-specific conspiracy beliefs. Self-reported COVID stress and emotive factors that 
could be related did not directly influence levels of conspiracy beliefs, and their indirect 
contribution was very small. Whether, how, and to which degree the societal levels of 
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